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ABSTRACT 
Distributed environments, like Peer-to-Peer and scientific networks, often require 
those that use the system (i.e. users) to utilize other nodes (i.e. resources) that are 
unknown. Users are unable to identify whether a resource will be honest, selfish, or ma-
licious. In order for users to reduce the risk of using a malicious resource and to motivate 
nodes from being selfish, we propose an adaptive reputation-based trust framework for 
distributed system applications. In this framework, users are able to appraise a resource 
by using price and a quantifiable metric of trust that is gathered from its own view and 
the views of other peers (i.e. references) regarding the reputation of the resource. The 
appraisal process provides the user with a reliable metric that can be used in the process 
of resource scheduling and selection. In response, economic resources will compete with 
each other using a variety of strategies that attempt to maximize their profit. The 
simulation results show that the framework is user friendly by providing long-term high 
satisfaction, filters out malicious nodes, and encourages resources to provide reliable and 
high-quality service. 
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CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW 
In this document, we will show that reputation, trust, and incentive can be correlated 
to provide an optimal selection of a resource in a peer-to-peer (P2P) environment. 
1.1 Introduction 
In distributed P2P applications, we can differentiate the roles of peers as user nodes 
and resource nodes (or users and resources for short). Resource nodes provide services 
utilizing their resources such as shared files, memory, or processors to users, while the 
users submit their jobs, e.g., downloading some files, to request for computation or usage 
of some types of resources. We study the resource scheduling/selection process for P2P 
applications, which can be further divided into two problems: (1) How to guarantee 
that users schedule their jobs to the most reliable resource nodes, especially when there 
exist some selfish and malicious resource nodes in the systems; (2) How to motivate the 
resource nodes to provide high-quality and reliable resources to the users. 
The first problem has attracted a lot of research, most of which are based on reputa-
tion and trust for resource scheduling. Selcuk, et al. defined several types of malicious 
resource nodes in (39) and proposed a reputation-based trust management scheme for 
P2P networks. Song and Hwang (40) first applied Fuzzy Logic for computing trust 
values in order to achieve security assurance and resource optimization in Grid Com-
puting systems. Azzedin, et al. (5) suggested that the trust values decay with time 
and trust relationships be based on a weighted combination of the direct relationships 
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between domains as well as on the global reputation of the domain. Kamvar, et al. 
proposed the EigenTrust algorithm (24) for reputation management in P2P networks. 
One problem in these papers is that they did not clearly differentiate reputation from 
trust. Reputation and trust are generally confused either as a probability with which 
the resource is expected to complete a job, or as a mechanism to help users to obtain 
such a probability. Some papers even referred to trust rating as the evaluation result of 
the transaction between users and resources. Such definition for trust is not accurate in 
many real-world scenarios. 
Less research has been done on the second problem. A few questions are raised, for 
example, why the resource nodes should provide their resources to the users selflessly, 
and why they should risk themselves being attacked for providing their resources without 
any benefit. A similar problem in file-sharing P2P applications such as Gnutella (21) and 
Kazaa (26) is free-riding due to the existence of free-riders who only want to download 
files from others but without sharing their files. Golle, et all. proposed a micro-payment 
mechanism (20) to encourage file sharing in P2P systems. Ramaswamy and Liu also 
discussed using utility functions (34) to measure the usefulness of the users. Although 
our purpose is not to solve free-riding and achieve fairness in P2P systems, we use the 
same idea to solve the second problem, i.e., users should give rewards or incentives to 
the resources that provide satisfactory services. 
In this thesis, we propose an adaptive reputation-based trust framework for peer-
to-peer applications called PeerCredential. In distributed ·p2p environments such as 
P2P networks or Grid computing systems, peers (i.e., users) often have to request the 
services from some unfamiliar peers (i.e., resources) that could be altruistic, selfish, or 
even malicious. Therefore, it is desirable to design an adaptive trust model to moti-
vate cooperativeness of selfish peers and minimize the risk from malicious peers. We 
assume the resource nodes are economic or selfish and the users should make payments 
for using the resources. Economic and selfish nodes aim at maximizing their profit. The 
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non-malicious resource nodes may compete with each other to gain as much profit as 
possible. Different from traditional reputation-based trust systems, we categorize the 
roles of peers into three: users, references, and resources. A peer can take one or more of 
these three roles at the same time within its application context. We define three basic 
quantifiable metrics: job satisfactory ratings, reputation, and trust, where reputation is 
calculated from the user's historical transaction-based job satisfactory ratings and trust 
is calculated from the user's own view as well as other peers' view (as references) on the 
reputation of a peer (resource). The metric trust can be used to quantify the trustwor-
thiness of peers and provide a trustable way of resource scheduling/selection and access 
control for peer-to-peer applications. The simulation results show that our framework 
supports economic resources to achieve long-term high user satisfaction, differentiates 
malicious nodes from normal ones, and encourages the resources to provide high-quality 
services. 
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CHAPTER 2. PREVIOUS WORK 
2.1 EigenRep: Reputation Management in P2P Networks 
(25) 
In this paper, Kamvar, et. al. describe a method in a peer-2-peer system to reduce 
the amount of inauthentic files that are downloaded. The method involves using an 
algorithm that assigns each peer with a unique global reputation value based upon their 
history of uploads (25). The reason a system like this is needed is that most P2P systems 
are anonymous in nature and therefore they are a breeding ground for viruses, trojans, 
and falsely named files. The EigenRep consists of normalizing the reputation values of 
each peer so that its value is between 0 and 1. The next thing the algorithm does is 
aggregate the normalized values by asking other peers their opinions and weighting the 
opinions based on a value of trust that the requestor has on that peer. The requestor then 
can make a decision based upon these values. The method for determining reputation 
in a peer-2-peer described in the paper minimizes the chance that a malicious peer will 
skew the decision in their favor. By allowing each peer to maintain trust and reputation 
values of each of their peers, they avoid having a centralized system do all of the work. 
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2.2 The EigenTrust Algorithm for Reputation Management 
in P2P Networks (24) 
Kamvar, et.al. describe an algorithm for maintaining and receiving reputation values 
from peers in both a distributed and non-distributed manner. The algorithm collects 
reputation values from other peers and their peers, etc. and then normalizes the end 
result in which the user is then able to make a decision regarding which resource to use. 
This system also relies on a set of pre-defined trusted peers in order for the system to 
be most effective. The problem with using pre-defined trusted peers is that if one were 
to turn malicious or get hacked, it would have a negative effect on the entire system 
similar to that of a house with a crumbling foundation. However, if the pre-defined 
peers remain untainted, the system is very effective at eliminating the use of malicious 
peers. Another issue that this algorithm faces is the amount of iterations required to 
receive trust values becomes increasingly lengthy as the size of the entire system increases 
reducing its scalability. 
2.3 Immunizing Online Reputation Reporting Systems 
Against Unfair Ratings and Discriminatory Behavior (10) 
In this paper, Dellarocas primarily focuses on the trading community and preventing 
maligned users from intentionally giving unfair or discriminatory ratings regardless of the 
transaction experience. Though this paper involves human intervention when rating, the 
mechanisms for providing unbiased references would be highly useful in the distributed 
computing world. In order to solve the problem of unfair ratings, the author proposes 
two mechanisms which could solve this quandry. One mechanism is using controlled 
anonymity during transactions to limit unfair low and negative ratings. The other 
mechanism is using cluster filtering to help eliminate most of the unfair high or positive 
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ratings. The research done by the author identified the different scenarios that take 
place in the trading world and have applied two mechanisms to process the results into 
a more legitimate rating. Furthermore, the author found that these mechanisms are 
flexible enough that they work in a variety of settings. 
2.4 Cooperative Peer Groups in NICE (27) 
Lee, et. al. go into detail on how to implement a non-centralized trust system in to 
the distributed environment, NICE or NICE is the Internet Cooperative Environment 
(30). NICE is a platform for implementing cooperative applications for the internet (27). 
Their focus is on a creating a solution that can identify cooperative and non-cooperative 
users and creating cooperative groups based on these identifications and applying it 
as a distributed system. The authors were able to achieve their goals by creating an 
algorithm that selects a trust path based on whether it is the strongest path or using a 
weighted sum of strongest disjoint paths (27). In the end, their solution was shown to 
be effective against malicious users and various attacks. 
2.5 Grid Resource Management, Scheduling and 
Computational Economy (7) 
Buyya, et. al. takes in to account the issue of resource management and how to sched-
ule jobs based on an economical concept. In this case, they describe a computational 
Grid that is made up of several different organizations that use their own management 
scheduling software. It is suggested that there is an actual cost in being able to access 
these various organizations for the right to use the resources located there. The problem 
is that there is no way to determine if that particular organization can meet the other 
requirements of the job to be submitted other than performance. The solution that they 
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came up with was an economic based approach for Grid computing. By providing an 
ability for the client to specify specific parameters and a maximum cost to execute the 
job, a barter of sorts can take place and the job is sent to the resource that meets the 
minimum requirements at the lowest cost. 
2.6 A Community Authorization Service for Group 
Collaboration (33) 
Laura Pearlman, Von Welch, Ian Foster, Carl Kesselman, and Steven Tuecke discuss 
the addition of new server to each Grid organization, calling it a community autho-
rization service or CAS for short. The function of the CAS is to provide a third party 
authorization service that would manage that particular Grid organization's resources. 
The CAS does this by maintaining a table of resources that the organization has. It 
maintains a policy that then determines what resources a user may be able to access 
through various permissions listed in the policy. An advantage to using the CAS system 
is that local and remote hosts only need to trust the relationships to CAS and not to 
each other, making this system very scalable. The downside to doing this is that the 
CAS will be doing all of the resource management and may create a bottleneck at the 
CAS itself. 
2.7 An Online Credential Repository for the Grid: MyProxy 
(31) 
Jason Novotny, Steven Tuecke, and Von \\Telch discuss the use of Grid portals, which 
allow access to Grid applications through a web site. The problem they discovered 
was that the security measures usually used in Grid applications were no longer avail-
able through the use of a web server. The authors then designed an online credentials 
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repository called MyProxy (31) to bridge the incompatibility gap between web and grid 
security. The requirements for creating such a device include: the ability to use any 
web browser available to access the Grid portal, to be able to use Grid resources from 
any location that their credentials would not be readily available to them, and that the 
Grid user would still be able to perform the duties that their credentials provide them. 
This is definitely a feature that a lot of Grid users would like to have. Since many Grid 
users would be scientists and may have to travel frequently, the ability to access the 
Grid from wherever they may be would allow these scientists to continue to perform 
their experiments away from the lab. 
2.8 A Reputation-Based Trust Management System for P2P 
Networks (39) 
Selcuk, et al. designed a protocol for Peer-2-Peer systems in which a peer that is 
looking to download a file uses reputation from itself and others to help determine which 
host to download from. Meanwhile, the authors define four types of malicious resources 
such as Naive, Hypocritical, Collaborative, and PsuedoSpoofing. The authors compare 
groups of peers that offer different versions of the same file first and then selects a node 
that is a subset of the selected group to download the file from. The protocol is too 
extreme in the evaluation as it appears there is only one criteria for rating a peer and 
that is if the file is correct or not. However, other criteria.could be examined such as 
length of time to download. In addition, when a peer is selecting a group to download a 
file from, it is possible that there may exist an overwhelming majority of positively rated 
peers in one group only to be tainted by a single peer with a positive distrust rating. 
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2.9 Evolving and Managing trust in Grid Computing Systems 
(5) 
Azzedin and Maheswaran describe a trust model that can be used for Grid computing. 
In their model, they determine trust levels of domains within the Grid where domains are 
groups of resources. Trust levels are determined based on the context of service and the 
declarations of other domains regarding the targeted group. Unfortunately, calculating 
trust for a group as a whole, malicious nodes could otherwise prevent perfectly good 
resources from be selected. However they do try to mitigate against this problem by 
using member weights as part of the domains evaluation, but systems that have been 
part of the domain for a longer amount of time could undermine the weighting system 
by purposely behaving until it had established itself in the domain. 
2.10 Reputation based Grid Resource Selection ( 4) 
Alunkal, et. al., convert the EigenTrust model for P2P network to one that under-
stands the Grid framework. A reliability trust is added for generalizing the status of 
an institution while an entity within the institution is also provided with a trust level. 
The user uses a heirachical decision process in order to select the best resource using 
the converted Eigentrust as a model. This system is highly scalable for the Grid due 
to heirchical format, which keeps the number of needed iterations down. However, this 
process lacks motivation by any of the refering institutions to process queries correctly. 
2.11 A Reputation-Based Approach for Choosing Reliable 
Resources in Peer-to-Peer Networks (9) 
Damiani, et. al., propose a system for peer-to-peer systems in which servents ask 
for a vote for a proposed resource. They select a subset of votes revceived and then 
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verify that they originated from the original servent to prevent any shill voting. The 
problem with using this algorithm to determine the best resource to use is that the other 
peers or servents have no incentive to provide accurate information or even respond to 
a query on any given resource, especially ones that perform well in order to prevent 
overloading their favorite resource. The proposed system does evaluate how votes are 
cast and reputation is also built for other servents which gets reset if they were to change 
thier ID to discourage pseudospoofing. 
2.12 Free Riding: A New Challenge to Peer-to-Peer File 
Sharing Systems (34) 
Ramaswamy and Liu discuss the free rider problem that infests many peer-to-peer 
systems. They proposed an incentive system that is aimed at keeping peers on the 
network to share their files which is based on three characteristics: the amount of files 
shared, the amount of data the peer has shared, and the popularity of the shared file. 
Peers are thus rewarded based on these metrics. The authors however do not address 
the spoofing that may occur when a peer wishes to gain access to the system. It would 
be possible for the peer to create many files with the name of a popular share in order 
to receive the reward which is additional download capability. Implementing file hashes 
would solve one problem, but does not prevent the peer from putting up a significant 
amount of large sized files in order to enhance its ability to download from the system. 
2.13 Incentives for Sharing in Peer-to-Peer Networks (20) 
Golle, et. al. proposed using game theory in addressing the free rider problem in 
peer-to-peer applications. Their goal was to provide an incentive model to peers in such 
a way that it balances the amount of downloading and uploading they do. To do this, 
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they introduce a micro-payment system in which peers pay to download and are paid 
when uploaded from. It was also stated the users would get annoyed from having to 
pay each and every time a few cents for a download, so they suggest selling blocks of 
credits to use with downloading. It appears there is no recourse for a peer to correct 
a transaction in which a bogus file may have been downloaded other than not use that 
resource again. The only form of motivation to peers to prevent uploading bogus files is 
that they only receive download credits. 
2.14 Internet Auction Sites 
Auction sites on the internet have become more popular over the last few years as 
they attract consumers and businesses alike due to ease of use and the potential deals 
that can be made. Auction sites are very comparable to a distributed system in that 
you have a group of buyers (the users) and a group of sellers (the resources). The buyers 
determine which seller to choose from based on any criteria that is available to them. 
Usually, the information available consists of a price and a rating. Once a buyer has 
selected a seller, the transaction is processed. The transaction is complete when both 
parties have rated one another. eBay (11) and Overstock.com Auctions (32) are two 
businesses that support a rating system. 
One of the most popular web auction sites, eBay, uses a simple rating system for 
both its buyers and sellers. Customers of eBay are allowed to rate their transaction 
partner with one of three ratings, positive, neutral, and negative. In addition, both 
buyers and sellers can make comments on the rating they gave to the other party as 
well as commenting on any ratings they have received themselves which is useful to 
explain why they may have received a bad score. All ratings are available to the general 
public although eBay does offer a service where they can make a user's rating private. 
The problem with this rating system is that buyers and sellers don't have to leave their 
12 
rating right away. In addition, the rating system is misused as a type of blackmail where 
the seller will not leave positive feedback until they receive positive feedback. Another 
problem is that of rating manipulation where a seller or buyer uses inexpensive items 
to build up their rating and then turn around and sell or buy a big ticket item without 
the intention to actually follow through with the sale. These problems make the rating 
system inaccurate at best. 
Overstock.corn Auctions uses a slightly different rating system that allows the buyers 
and sellers to use more precision in how they rate their transaction partner by allow five 
levels rather than three. However, Overstock Auctions has the same pitfalls that eBay 
has and relies on their users to be fair and honest. 
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CHAPTER 3. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In this section, we discuss the system and threat model. Then, we present our prob-
lem definition and four primary goals for our adaptive reputation-based trust framework 
for P2P applications. 
3.1 System Model 
In P2P applications, the roles of peers can be categorized as resource nodes and user 
nodes. Resource nodes provide services utilizing their resources such as shared files, 
memory and processors for users. In general, we say users would like to use resources 
by submitting jobs, and resources provide services by processing these jobs. We model 
the systems using a graph G = (V, E), where Vis the set of vertices and Eis the set of 
edges. Each vertex represents a node in the systems. Moreover, we have V =Vu U Yrs, 
where Vu is the set of users and Yrs is the set of resource nodes. We also define E = { < 
x, y > Ix E Vu, y E Yrs}, where the edge < x, y > denotes the interaction or relationship 
between user x and resource y. Compared to the traditional distributed systems, one 
property of P2P systems is: The roles of resources and users are not static. Physically, 
a particular node can be either a user or a resource, or even both at the same time, i.e., 
the node can provide its resource to others and simultaneously submit its own job to 
request the resources provided by others. 
To motivate resources to provide high-quality services to users, we assume users 
would pay for the jobs they submitted. Let us consider such a scenario: Before each 
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user submits its jobs, it queries the system for available resources that can fulfil its 
jobs. Receiving the query, those resources capable and willing to process the jobs would 
respond to the user with the desired payment (or price) for processing the jobs. Ideally, 
users and resources are economic. Thus, an economic user would select one or multiple 
best resources, e.g., those offering the lowest price or most reliable ones (We will discuss 
how to select the best ones later.) to process its jobs. Meanwhile, the economic resources 
would compete with each other by offering a price to win the competition in order to 
maximize the profit. Note: Always offering the lowest or highest price cannot guarantee 
the maximum profit. 
3.2 Threat Model 
We assume users pay before using resources, hence, there is no way for users to 
repudiate. However, there do exist some selfish or malicious resources that refuse to 
provide satisfactory services or even attach the user through malicious resources, e.g., 
offering a shared file that contains malicious code after receiving the users' payments. 
Therefore, we must identify these possible threats. 
• Honest Resource: An honest resource is not a malicious one in itself, but it 
follows a strategy that must be addressed. By always providing the lowest possible 
price and performing jobs to a satisfactory level, the honest resource is attempting 
to undercut the competition. Its goal is to be a monop9ly to the distributed system 
equivalent to WalMart in the retail trade. This would be very dangerous because 
it can cause severe damages to the system if it becomes malicious. We denote the 
set of honest resources by Vrs_H. 
• Naive Resource: A naive resource always offers the lowest price to make sure it 
is selected by users, however, it would never really provide the services required by 
the users. Its goal is to disturb the system as much as possible by always providing 
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false information to inquiring users. Moreover, a naive resource may also choose 
to provide malicious services, instead of refusing service. V'.rs_N denotes the set of 
naive resources. 
• Selfish Resource: A selfish resource tries to maximize its profit by refusing to 
provide services to users after receiving their payments. However, to attract more 
users, a selfish resource may act as an economic one most of the time by providing 
satisfactory services to the users. It is not a malicious one. We use V'.rs_Sf to denote 
the set of selfish resources. 
• Random and Structured Hypocritical Resource: Hypocritical resource is 
malicious one, but its behavior is similar to a selfish one because they both provide 
satisfactory services to users a majority of the time. The differences between 
them are: ( 1) Hypocritical resources may provide malicious services, but selfish 
ones never, except for only refusing to serve the users as requested. (2) They 
have different purposes by providing satisfactory services to the users. A selfish 
resource's goal is to maximize its profit, but a hypocritical one only wants to deploy 
their malicious services by attracting more users to use them. 
The random hypocritical resource is associated with a probability to determine 
when to act maliciously. For example, if the probability is 20%, it would randomly 
be malicious in 20% of its lifetime. On the contrary, a structured hypocritical 
resource does not make decisions to be malicious based on chance. It follows a 
set pattern to act maliciously. For example, it may be malicious every time after 
providing four satisfactory services. Hence, it would also be malicious in 20% of its 
lifetime. We use V'.rs_HyR and Vrs_HyS to denote the set of random and structured 
hypocritical resources. 
• Collaborative Resource: Resource nodes and user nodes may be collaborative 
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and form a special group. They act differently depending on whether the requesting 
peers are in the same group. For example, a collaborative resource will provide 
satisfactory services to a user if they are from the same group. Otherwise, it 
may refuse to provide services or even provide malicious services to the user since 
the user is outside its group. We further categorize collaborative resources into 
different types based on three aspects such as Resource Availability, Resource 
Price and Resource Performance. These aspects specify whether the resource is 
available to the outsider, what price they offer to the outsider, and what quality of 
service they provide to the outsider. Specifically, they can say they are available 
or unavailable to outsider; they can offer the lowest price, the normal price (as to 
their peers), or a higher price (than the normal one) to outsider; they can refuse to 
provide their services, or provide the normal or malicious services. We use Vrs_c 
to denote the set of collaborative resources and list all possible options for each 
aspect in TABLE I. The combinations of these options represent the various types 
of collaborative resources. Note: Not all combinations are valid. For example, if 
Resource Availability is unavailable, there is no choice for the other two aspects 
except for "N /A" . 
• PseudoSpoofing Resource: PseudoSpoofing resources are those nodes who 
change their identities frequently in case they are recognized by users as being 
malicious. There are several ways to contain this threate. One solution would be 
to charge every new node that enters the P2P system in order to make it expensive 
to repeatedly rejoin. Another method would involve the newcomer to pay other 
nodes to download from it so that it may grow its reputation. However, since this 
type of threate can be easily mitigated by any of the above solutions, we will not 
discuss it further in our paper. 
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Table 3.1 Various Options in Three Aspects for Different Types of Collab-
orative Resources 
Resource Availability Resource Price Resource Performance 
Available or unavailable Lowest, Normal or Higher Refusing, Normal or Malicious 
Let VE to denote the economic (or normal) resource. We can further divide the set of 
resource nodes into various types such that we get: 
Note: Although it is possible that there may exist malicious users, e.g., those who 
submit jobs containing malicious code to crash the resources, this is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. 
3.3 Problem Definition 
Considering that P2P systems consist of users and various types of resources, we 
study the resource management and scheduling problem, i.e., how to efficiently moti-
vate resources to provide satisfactory services to users and how to guide users to select 
the most reliable resources to fulfill their jobs in the cases there exist even malicious 
resources. We expect to design a scheme for distributed P2P applications to achieve the 
following goals: 
1. Motivate the economic and non-malicious resources to provide the best services as 
possible. 
2. Reduce the impact that malicious resources have on the system as a whole. 
3. Provide a facility for an economic user access the best resources possible. 
4. Allow per usage contracts for greater flexibility compared to long term contracts. 
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CHAPTER 4. A FRAMEWORK FOR SUPPORTING 
REPUTATION-BASED TRUST FOR P2P APPLICATIONS 
4.1 Overview 
In our framework, we introduce three roles of peers: user, resource and reference. A 
reference is a node from whom a user can ask its opinion about a resource. It is needed 
because a user may not have any experience with a resource in order to evaluate it. After 
each job is finished, a user gives a job rating, which is a value between zero and one to 
evaluate the quality the job processed by the resource. Based on a sequence of histor-
ical job ratings, the user can calculate the reputation for each resource to measure the 
overall quality of services that have been provided. Moreover, combining the job ratings 
provided by the references, the user calculates the trust value for each resource, which 
indicates the probability that the user can expect the resource to provide a satisfactory 
service for its next job. Considering both the price and trust of resources, the user can 
calculate and compare the risk assessments to select the most appropriate (reliable) 
resource to fulfill its job. Meanwhile, all economic resources compete with each other to 
try to win the user's selection competition in order to maximize their profit. We design 
a number of strategies for resources that determine the price they should offer to win 
the competitions in a long term. 
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4.2 Job Rating 
A job contains the requirements for some resources. It may involve the types of 
resources needed, the deadline to finish the job, whether it needs encryption, or any 
other requirements. A transaction between a user and a resource is referred as the 
processing of a job. After receiving the result of the job or timeout, the user evaluates 
the result of the job. A job rating of a user to a resource is a metric used by the user 
to evaluate the quality of job having been processed. In our approach, the job rating is 
represented by a value between zero and one. (Note: Job rating is named as trust rating 
in some papers, and some use this rating as a binary value, either zero or one.) 
The job rating measures the quality of service the resource provided in a particular 
transaction. It may depend on various metrics such as how fast the job is finished, 
whether the resource provides security or privacy mechanisms for processing the job, 
and so on. For example, the user can set a soft deadline and a hard deadline for each 
job, while the soft one is ahead of the hard one. If the resource finishes the job before 
the soft deadline, it is scored with the highest job rating. Otherwise, the rating would 
go down from one to zero until the hard deadline is missed. The two deadlines would be 
encapsulated in the query when the user ask for the availability of resources. A resource 
responds "unavailable" if it figures out it cannot finish the job before the deadlines. The 
job rating brs(x, y) of user x on resource y for some transaction can be computed as 
follows: 
( 4.1) 
where qi E ( 0, 1] is the score or the rating of one of n metrics used by the user to 
evaluate the quality of service, and Wix E ( 0, 1] is the weight of the corresponding metric. 
Typically, 2=r=1 wix = 1. 
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4.3 Reputation 
The reputation of a user on a resource is a metric measuring the overall quality of 
previous transactions between the resource and the user. In our framework, it is a value 
between zero and one, calculated from the job ratings recorded by the user. In other 
papers, it is called local trust, which we believe confuses the trust and the reputation and 
is not accurate. Assume each user stores at most n job ratings of previous transactions 
for each resource, the reputation r rs ( x, y) of user x for resource y is: 
( ) _ I:~=l O'.i · brs,i(x, y) rrsX,Y- "'n i ' 
L...,i=l O'. 
( 4.2) 
where brs,i(x, y) denotes the i-th job rating and the first rating corresponds to the most 
recent job. a E (0, 1] is a decay factor, which indicates how important the most recent 
transaction to the reputation. Note: Each user may set the different value of a for itself. 
4.4 Reference 
Before submitting its jobs, a user needs to evaluate the resources to select the most 
appropriate one for processing the jobs. Since the user may not have any transaction 
or sufficient number of transactions with the resource, the user would ask the opinions 
of other nodes, called references, to gain an overall evaluation of the resource. Let Vr f 
denote the set of references. Thus, we add these new type of nodes to our system model 
so that we have G = (V, E), where V = Vu U "Vrs U 11r1· Physically, each node can be 
a user, resource, or reference, but we assume a resource node can not be a reference 
to itself. More strictly, any resource cannot be reference to the same type of resources. 
Similar to resources, the user should also pay the references for buying their information, 
and the references would compete with each other to sell their information to the user. 
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4.5 Trust 
In our framework, the opinion or information provided by a reference is just the job 
ratings that the reference recorded for the resource. Thus, the user can use these job 
ratings of references to calculate a trust value of the resource. We define trust as the 
probability with which the user expects the resource to finish its next job. When a user 
x receives the job ratings for a particular resource y from n references Zi ( i = 1, · · · , n), 
and if all nodes use the same decay factor o:, then x can compute the reputation rrs(zi, y) 
of each reference zi for resource y. Thus, the trust tr(x, y) of user x to resource y is: 
( ) _ rrs(x, y) + L~=l rrJ(x, zi) · rrs(zi, y) tr x, y - n ( ) ' 
1 + Li=l rrf x, Zi 
( 4.3) 
where rrJ(x, zi) denotes the reputation of user x to reference Zi· In (4.3), we weight 
the reputation rrs(zi, y) by rrJ(x, zi)· This illustrates how reliable the user believes the 
information from each reference Zi. 
4. 6 Risk Assessment 
After computing the trust of each resource and receiving the price offered by each 
resource, the user can begin to select the most appropriate resource to fulfill its jobs. 
Generally, the user would like to choose a high-quality resource that also offers an accept-
able price. (Certainly, the user can have other metrics to determine the most appropriate 
one.). In our framework, we define risk assessment as a metric used by the user to select 
the most appropriate resource. If only considering the price and the quality of service 
of resource, the risk assessment v(x, y) computed by a user x for a resource y is: 
v(x, y) = pr(y) · (1 - tr(x, y)), ( 4.4) 
where pr(y) denotes the price offered by resource y. The user would select the resource 
who has the lowest value of risk assessment. A risk assessment brings a balance between 
the quality of service and the price offered by a resource. 
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4. 7 Reference's Adaptive Adjustment on its Reputation 
Values 
We should notice that references can also be malicious. They may provide false 
information and mislead the user to choose a poor or malicious resource. Similar to the 
classification of resources, we define various types of references: 
(4.5) 
where VrJ_E denotes the normal or economic references and VrJ_N, VrJ_HyR, VrJ_HyS and 
Vr f _c denote other malicious references, whose definitions are similar to those of mali-
cious resources. 
Therefore, the user needs a way to evaluate references to mitigate against the mali-
cious ones. Since the information provided by the reference helps the user predict the 
quality of service for the resource, the closer the information to the real result, the more 
reliable the reference would be. For a particular resource y and a transaction, we define 
br f ( x, z) as the rating of a user x to a reference z: 
brJ(x, Z) = 1 - lbrs(x, y) - Trs(z, y) I, ( 4.6) 
where brs(x, y) denotes the job rating of this transaction between x and y, and rrs(z, y) 
is the reputation of reference z for resource y computed by user x from the information 
collected from z (If x and z have a different decay factor a, x should use r( z, y)) instead 
of r(z, y).). brJ(x, z) will be stored by user x and used to update rr1(x, z) by the way 
similar to ( 4. 2). 
4.8 Strategies for Resources to Achieve Their Profit Goal 
A resource receives the payments from a user for processing the user's jobs. Except 
for malicious resources, a normal one must be economic, i.e., the purpose of an economic 
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Figure 4.1 Find Nash Equilibrium based on Iterated Strict Dominance 
resource is to maximize its profit. In the following sections, we will discuss a number of 
strategies for resources to fulfill this purpose. 
4.8.1 Binary and Exponential Strategies 
Suppose a resource can offer a price from $1, · · · $n. Here, we assume the price is the 
net income where the cost has been deduced. 
For simplicity, we first consider such a scenario: There are two resources denoted as 
A and B. They happen to have the same reputations. Hence, the price they offered 
uniquely determine who is winner. If they offer the same price, the user may randomly 
select any one. In this case, their expected profit is the half of the price. Let us assume 
the maximum price is $3. 
We can regard the competition between these two resources as a simple game. The 
payoff matrix of resource A and Bis shown in Fig. 4.l(a), where each resource has three 
strategies that correspond to the price they can offer. The first element of each entry is 
the expected profit of resource A, while the second one is that of resource B. Based on 
Game Theory, we can solve the Nash Equilibrium of this game by finding the iterated 
strict dominance (18): For resource A, its profit vector for strategy 3 is (0, 0, ~), while 
that of strategy 2 is (0, 1, 2). Since each element of strategy 3's vector is less than that 
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of strategy 2's, strategy 3 is strictly dominated. Hence, resource A would never select 
strategy 3. Fig. 4.1 (b) shows the resultant matrix by removing strategy 3 of resource A. 
We assume resource B also knows this. Now for resource B, strategy 3 becomes strictly 
dominated by strategy 2 since the corresponding profit vector ( 0, 0) < ( 0, 1). Hence, 
B would never choose strategy 3, and the resultant matrix is shown in Fig. 4.1 ( c). 
Repeatedly, the final strategy for A and B would be strategy 1. This process of finding 
iterated strict dominance can be applied to the case when n is set to be an arbitrary 
value. Therefore, our conclusion is: If playing one time of this game, the best strategy 
of all resources would be offering the lowest price. 
Now consider a more complicated scenario: There are a total of m resources in 
competition. Each time there are a total of k jobs generated in the system, and each 
resource node can only process one job per time. If k 2': m, a clever resource can select a 
strategy by always offering the highest price. Clearly, the users would first select those 
resources offering the lower price. However, after other resources have been selected, 
the clever resource would be the only available one. Since there are sufficient number 
of un-submitted jobs, this resource will be definitely selected even offering the highest 
price. Thus, this strategy can maximize the resource's profit. If k < m, according to 
the discussion of the simple game, all resources have to offer the lowest price in order 
to win the selection. We call this strategy Binary Strategy in which the resources would 
offer either the lowest or the highest price depending on current load of the system, i.e., 
the current number of jobs produced. 
Our system is dynamic because each user will generate its jobs independently and the 
length of each job is not identical. Hence, it is hard for resources to measure the current 
load of system accurately. The number of available resources cannot be accurately 
estimated either. Considering this dynamic system model and long-term competition 
between resources, Binary Strategy may not be the best. Therefore, we modify the 
Binary Strategy to be a Exponential Strategy. In Exponential Strategy, each resource 
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tries to measure the current load and compare it with the capacity of system, i.e., the 
total number of jobs all resources can process per time unit. The price a resource offers 
is an exponential function of the difference between the current load and the system 
capacity. The idea is that if the current load is sufficiently larger or less than the system 
capacity, the resource will be more confident to ignore the error in measurement and 
decide to choose the highest or lowest price correspondingly. The following equation 
shows how to compute the price in Exponential Strategy. 
1 
(4.7) PT =PT max . 1 + e-k(m-a)' 
where pr max is the highest price a resource can offer, m is the measured load, a is the 
predetermined system capacity, and k is a factor used to adjust the slope of the function. 
The greater the value of k, the closer the function to be a binary one. 
4.8.2 Historical Strategy 
Binary Strategy and Exponential Strategy are only concerned about the difference 
between the current load and system capacity. There exists other information, e.g., 
the previous prices offered by other competitors, which may be useful for a resource 
to determine their price. The idea is one can estimate the possible next price of its 
competitors via the previous prices offered by those ones, because when this resource 
once had transactions with its competitors when it acted as user at that time. Hence, 
we propose an estimation-based strategy, called Historical Strategy. 
Assume two resources y1 and y2 are competing with each other for the selection by 
user x. User x would select one resource by finding the lower of the two risk assessments 
v(x,y1) = pr(y1) · (1- tr(x,y1)) and v(x,y2 ) = pr(y2 ) • (1 - tr(x,y2 )). To win y2 in 
the competition, y1 wants to find pr(y2 ) the estimated price of y2 , and fr(x, y2)) the 
estimated trust of x to y2 . After that, y1 can determine an appropriate price pr(yi) that 
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can make it to win y2 . Equivalently, y1 would like to decide pr(yi) 
where fr(x, y1 ) is the estimated trust of x to y1 computed by y1 itself. Since y1 knows 
the quality of every transaction between itself and x, it can easily estimate fr(x, y 1). 
Meanwhile, it can also estimate 
( 4.9) 
The idea behind this estimation is that y 1 assumes y2 provided similar quality of services 
to x and itself, hence, its trust to y2 can be used to estimate x's trust to y2 . We further 
assume y1 uses the following equation to estimate the price of y2 based on the previous 
prices it received from y2• 
(4.10) 
where pri(y1, y2 ) denote the i-th price of y2 stored by y1 , and (3 is a decay factor. 
4.8.3 Hybrid Strategies 
Historical Strategy is a highly competitive strategy when trying to get selected, how-
ever it is unable to capitalize on its reputation when the number of jobs exceed the 
amount of resources available. This is the result of its pricing strategy in which it 
still attempts to compete with the best appraised resources". In an attempt to alleviate 
this problem, we suggest two more strategies, Historical-Binary Hybrid Strategy and 
Historical-Exponential Hybrid Strategy. 
The Historical-Binary Hybrid Strategy is the result of a resource using historical 
analysis whenever the resource utilization is below full capacity. Once capacity has 
been achieved, the resource uses the binary strategy of selecting the maximum price 
allowed by the system. This strategy allows the resource to remain competitive with 
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other nodes when resource utilization is light but attempts capitalize on its reputation 
with the maximum price bidding when resource utilization is heavy as it no longer has 
to worry about being selected with enough jobs to go around. 
The Historical-Exponential Hybrid Strategy is very similiar to that of the Historical-
Binary Hybrid Strategy with one exception: instead of bidding with the maximum price 
when resource utilization is greater than the load threshold, it uses the exponential strat-
egy to make its bid. This enables the Historical-Exponential Hybrid Strategy to compete 
with cheaper resources when the job load is light and compete with the Exponential 
Strategy when the job load is heavy. 
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CHAPTER 5. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND 
RESULTS 
5.1 Evaluation Metrics 
To evaluate the performance of our approach, we measure the following metrics: 
1. User Satisfaction: It is defined as the ratio of the amount of jobs deemed successful 
by all users over the total amount of jobs run within every equal-length period of 
time . This will help us determine whether or not malicious resources have any 
impact on the job scheduling process. 
2. Average Resource Reputation: It is defined as the average value of the reputations 
of all users for every resource at a given time instant. This metric is valuable to 
help users to differentiate various types of malicious resources. 
3. Average Number of Times Resource Selected: It measures the average number of 
times any resource of every type has ever been selected. This is another value that 
helps us determine if users are selecting reliable resources at a greater frequency 
than malicious resources. 
4. Average Resource Earnings: It measures the average amount of income any re-
source of every type has earned. It allows us to identify whether or not incentives 
are being applied to the appropriate resources. In addition, it helps us to identify 
what the most profitable strategy is for an normal resource. 
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Table 5.1 Basic Configuration 
Node Types Number 
Historical Strategy Resource / Reference 3 I 21 
Exponential Strategy Resource / Reference 3; 21 
Binary Strategy Resource / Reference 3 / 21 
Honest Resource / Reference 2 / 1 
Naive Resource / Reference 2 / 4 
Random Hypocritical Resource / Reference 2 / 4 
Structured Hypocritical Resource / Reference 2; 4 
Collaborative Resource / Reference 3 / 4 
5.2 Simulation Setup 
Our simulation consists of 100 nodes including 20 resources and 80 references. All 
nodes can act as users. For simplicity, we only have one type of job for which resources 
can process. For every time slot, called a tick, each user generates a number of jobs. The 
interval between the jobs generated by each user satisfies an exponential distribution, 
whose parameter determines whether it is a normal load or heavy load in our system. 
The length of each job is a random number drawn from (0, 10] with an average job length 
of 5 ticks. We assume each resource can process 3 jobs simultaneously. Hence, the whole 
system can process 20 x 3 jobs in 5 ticks, which leads to a system capacity 12 jobs per tick. 
We set a satisfactory threshold 0. 75 to measure if the result of a finished job is satisfactory 
by the user. The quality of each job processing is randomly determined depending on 
whether the resource is reliable or malicious. For a job processed by a reliable resource, a 
job rating is a random number drawn from [O. 75, 1] with an average rating 0.875, while 
for a malicious resource, the job rating is always 0.01. The minimum and maximum 
price a resource can offer are $.01 and $100, respectively. In our simulation, the decay 
factor o: = f3 = 0.9. 
To test our framework, we built a variety of simulation setups to test our approach 
and to compare the set of non-malicious resource strategies. The first type of setup that 
we used is called the Malicious Collaborative Group Configuration. In this configuration, 
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we attempt to spread out the strategic resources evenly while attempting to keep the 
total number of potentially malicious nodes as a minority. The configuration is very 
hostile considering the amount of malicious resources allocated, however we expect that 
the real world application of this system would have considerably less. In this particular 
configuration, the probability for random hypocritical nodes being malicious is 203, 
and the pattern for structured hypocritical nodes is to be malicious every four jobs. 
The purpose of the collaborative nodes is to provide malicious services to the non-group 
members. If the user is not within the same collaborative group as the resource and 
reference, the resource and reference will offer the lowest price and perform maliciously. 
Otherwise, they act normally by choosing the historical strategy since the user is their 
group member. This group uses the parameters found in Table 5.2: 
Table 5.2 Malicious Collaborative Group 
Res. Avail. Res.$ Res. Perf. Ref. Avail. Ref.$ Ref. Perf. 
Allow Lowest Malicious Allow Lowest Always False 
In our strategy comparison, we first test each type of the hybrid resources against 
the Malicious Collaborative Configurations that the historical resources already had to 
endure. We then simulated one on one comparisons of the historical, binary hybrid, 
and exponential hybrid strategies against the exponential strategy. In these simulations, 
all types of resources and references were removed with the execption of those being 
tested. We wanted to observe whether or not historical, binary hybrid, or exponential 
related resources would be influenced by the cheaper reliable and unreliable nodes. As a 
result, we have 10 historical, historical-binary, or historical-exponential resources and 10 
exponential strategy resources, 40 historical, historical-binary, or historical-exponential 
references and 40 exponential strategy references. 
A simulation is complete when 10000 ticks have been completed. We ran the sim-
ulation 5 times for each data set in order to create the graphs shown in Appendix A. 
This was done in order to eliminate any possible anomalies. For each configuration we 
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tested, we gathered a data set that was based on a normal load and a heavy load. A 
normal load in our configuration should on average generate 6 jobs per tick, while the 
heavy load parameter generates on average 12 jobs per tick. 
5.3 Simulation Results 
5.3.1 User Satisfaction 
Normal and Heavy Load Configuration with Malicious Collaborative Group Results: 
Fig. A.1 (a) and Fig. A. l (b) shows that our approach offers high user satisfaction over 
both resources and references very quickly. The user satisfactions converge to more 
than 903 only after 2000 ticks in the normal load configuration and 3000 ticks in the 
heavy load configuration, which indicates that user nodes are using reliable resources 
and references before they are forced to use malicious ones or wait for available reliable 
ones. In our simulations, we discovered that regardless of the job load in the system, 
user satisfaction remained constant. 
5.3.2 Average Resource Reputation 
Normal and Heavy Load Configuration with Malicious Collaborative Group Results: 
Fig. A.2(a) and Fig. A.2(b) illustrates how fast the average reputation of each type 
of resources converges. In the simulation, this metric is only calculated based on the 
job ratings of those users that had used a resource. Figs. A.2(a) and A.2(b) indicate 
our approach can differentiate malicious resources quickly. In our simulation, the job 
rating for a reliable resource is 0.875 in average, while that for a malicious one is 0.01. 
Therefore, the average reputation of a binary, historical, exponential strategy and honest 
resource should converge to around 0.9, while the naive one converges to 0.01. For a 
hypocritical resource, no matter whether it is random or structured one, it will be 
malicious with a probability 203. Hence, it will gain a rating of 0.01 with a probability 
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203 and a rating of 0.875 with a probability 803. Its reputation will converge to 
0.01 x 203 + 0.875 x 803 ,..__, 0. 7, which is consistent with the simulation results. The 
case for collaborative resource is a bit more complicated than the others. A collaborative 
resource would be malicious to non-members and reliable to members. In our simulation 
configuration, a collaborative resource has 93 non-member nodes who are likely to give 
a 0.01 rating and 6 member nodes giving a rating of 0.875. Hence, we would expect the 
collaborative node to eventually converge around 0.01 x ~~ + 0.875 x 969 ,..__, .07. 
5.3.3 Average Number of Times Resource Selected 
Normal and Heavy Load Configuration with Malicious Collaborative Group Results: 
In Figs. A.3(a) and A.3(b), we show how the average number of times a resource 
selected increases as time passes under a normal and heavy load. It is simple to show 
that honest resources will be selected most often as they are reliable and always offer 
the services with the lowest price. The same effect can be seen with the binary nodes as 
well because there is not enough resource utilization to trip its highest price, therefore, 
they effectively act as a honest resource. The historical resource is selected considerably 
less due to the fact it has a slightly higher price than the lowest one, thus, it is the next 
in line to be selected by users after the honest and binary ones are filled. Both types 
of hypocritical resources are only 803 as reliable as a historical one, so it is reasonable 
that they would be selected 203 less than historical one, even thought they follow the 
same pricing strategy. In the long term, collaborative resources will only be selected by 
its own members. Therefore, its curve is linear but only 63 as the honest and binary 
ones are because only 6 users are able to utilize it positively. The exponential ones are 
only selected after users are able to filter malicious ones such as naive. Due to their 
higher price, they can only be selected after historical resources are filled and the user 
has had enough bad experiences with the hypocritical resources. 
Historical-Binary in Configuration with Malicious Collaborative Group: Fig. A.5(a) 
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we see that the average number times that the historical-binary node has been selected 
has increased compared to the historical resources shown in Fig. A.3(a). In contrast, 
in Fig. A.5(b), there appears to be a slight decline in the number of time selected as 
compared to the historical resource. This slight decline could be a result of using the 
maximum price as a bid when it thinks that the load is high. The problem is that the 
the other nodes will have a lower price at the 12 job per tick threshold and they will 
be utilized first at that point. However, neither the positive and negative variances in 
resource selection are great enough to be significant in this simulation. 
Historical-Exponential in Configuration with Malicious Collaborative Group: In Fig. 
A.6(a), the amount of times that the historical-exponential resource was selected is 
equivalent to that of the historical resource shown in fig. A.3(a). The reason is most 
likely due to the fact that the historical-exponential node was operating as a historical 
node most of the time. 
5.3.4 Average Resource Earnings 
Normal and Heavy Load Configuration with Malicious Collaborative Group Results: 
Figs. A.4(a) and A.4(b) show the average income that each type of resource has earned 
at any time. Interestingly, though the exponential resource is selected the fewest amount 
of times of all of the reliable resources, it yields the most income of all the nodes. It 
earns less at the beginning, however once it gains reputation, it could get selected at a 
higher value that would remain constant if resource utilizatiOn does not change. Honest 
resources have stabilized on a low price, although slightly higher than that of honest 
and binary, therefore, they receive greater income. Both hypocritical nodes also use the 
same pricing strategy as that the historical resource does, but are selected less often due 
to the 203 chance of being malicious. Collaborative resources are basically historical 
resources to a much smaller audience, therefore, are going to have even less income. 
Honest and binary income is equivalent to 1/100 of their selection frequency because 
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they earn $0.01 every time selected. 
Historical-Binary in Configuration with Malicious Collaborative Group: Fig. A. 7( a) 
and Fig. A.7(b) show practically the same results as those shown in Fig. A.4(a) and 
Fig. A.4(b). This is a result of the high price that the binary-historical resource has 
when the system is heavily utilized. Since its price is greater than any of the other nodes 
when resources are being heavily used, it will be selected last if at all. 
Historical-Exponential in Configuration with Malicious Collaborative Group: Fig. 
A.8(a) shows that the historical-exponential resource's income average reflects that of 
the the historical resource income. average as the average load for the system is mostly 
below the threshold required to use the exponential pricing algorithm. 
5.3.5 Strategy Comparison Configuration Results 
In this configuration, we compare the performance of historical strategy and expo-
nential strategy by measuring the average times a resource is selected and the average 
income a resource has earned. First we will show how each of the hybrid strategies 
perform in the configuration with the malicious collaborative group in both normal and 
heavy load scenarios, and then we eliminate all other node types beside the hybrid and 
the exponential resource to see if the "cheap" nodes had any effect on the historical or 
hybrid resources. 
5.3.5.1 Average Number of Times Resource Selected 
Historical vs. Exponential: In Fig. A.9(a) and Fig. A.9(b), we see that the historical 
resources are being selected more often than the exponential, due to their low price. Once 
the historical resources have been fully selected, users have no choice but to select the 
exponential resources. In the heavy load scenario, it appears that the amount of times 
that each type of node gets selected eventually converges to about the same amount. The 
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primary reason that these two types of resources eventually converge is that the amount 
of jobs being created should eventually meet the expected supply by the resources. 
Historical-Binary vs. Exponential: In Fig. A.lO(a), the historical-binary resource 
is seen being selected more often than the exponential as it is primarily acting as a 
historical resource with resource utilization being down. However the times that the 
resource utilization does cross the threshold set by the historical-binary resource, leaves 
it vulnerable to the pricing strategy of the exponential resource, allowing them to be 
picked first. In the heavy load scenario A.lO(b), the above scenario is amplified in such a 
way that the exponential pricing scheme is actually cheaper to select from. This results 
in the historical-binary resources being selected less. 
Fig. A.6(b) shows a higher selection average for the historical-exponential hybrid 
than the historical in A.3(b). This is unexpected as the result should have been lower 
due to higher prices it was bidding. The most probable explanation is that the amount 
of times that hypocritical and binary resources were selected was lower in Fig. A.6(b). 
This would have resulted in the historical-exponential nodes taking up the slack when 
resource utilization was low. A reason that the hypocritical nodes are lower is that they 
are bit more volitile than the other nodes and will have variances one simulation to the 
next. The reason the binary nodes had reduced its average selection rate is that the 
hybrid nodes are priced more competitively at higher loads and therefore will take away 
from the binary resource's selection average. 
Historical-Exponential vs. Exponential: In Fig. A.ll(a), the curves match directly 
with that of the historical vs. exponential in Fig. A.9(a). However in the heavier loaded 
Fig. A.11 (b), the historical-exponential curve is the only one of the three strategies 
compared against the exponential strategy to not be concave. This is most likely due 
to its ability to compete with the exponential resource in both normal and heavy load 
situations. 
36 
5.3.5.2 Average Resource Earnings 
Historical vs. Exponential: In Fig. A.12(a) and Fig. A.12(b), the exponential 
resource earns more income even though it is much less selected as the historical one 
does. Since the historical resource uses a pricing strategy that is dependent on the lowest 
risk assessment of any resource peer, its price will remain lower than that of exponential 
one. As a result, any historical resources will get selected before exponential resources. 
Due to the price differential, once exponential resources are selected, they are able to 
make a much larger profit than the historical ones are. Therefore, we can conclude that 
the exponential strategy is better than historical one in maximizing the resource's profit. 
However, the historical one is also useful to make the malicious ones get less selected. 
Otherwise, the users have to experience more malicious services. 
Historical-Binary vs. Exponential: In Fig. A.13(a) and Fig. A.13(b), these curves 
are not much different than the previous two figures A.12(a) and A.12(b). However 
it should be noted that althought the historical-binay resource performed the same in 
income to the previous configuration involving the historical resources, it did not have 
to be selected as often to acheive that price. 
Fig. A.8(b) shows that the historical-expoenential resource has a much higher income 
average than what a historical resource (Fig. A.4(b) would have. However it still is not 
equal to the average income that the expontial node has. In addition, it is utilized much 
heavier than the exponential resource to even achieve the higher income average which 
would reduce its net income gain. 
Historical-Exponential vs. Exponential: In Fig. A.14(a), this graph is really no 
different than the other configuration's normal load income graphs as it mostly acts as a 
historical resource with the load utilization down. Fig A.14(b) was a real surprise, due 
to the fact that the historical-exponential is looking to beat the exponential resource in 
total income in the long run. It appears that the "cheap" nodes do have an effect on 
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the hybrid. However, even though the historical-exponential node is equivalent to the 
income average of the exponential resource, it is still heavily utilized and would most 
likely result in smaller net gain. We have to conclude that the exponential resource is 
the most ideal model for resources to follow if monetary gain is important. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we propose an adaptive reputation-based trust framework for peer-to-
peer applications. Besides malicious nodes, we assume there exist economic and selfish 
nodes who compete with each other to maximize their profit. Different from traditional 
reputation-based trust systems, we categorized the roles of peers into three: users, ref-
erences, and resources. A peer can take one or more of these three roles at the same 
time within its application context. We defined four basic quantifiable metrics: job 
satisfactory ratings, reputation, trust, and appraisal. The metric trust can be used to 
quantify the trustworthiness of peers and provide a trustable way of resource schedul-
ing/ selection and access control for peer-to-peer applications. We select an appropriate 
resource to serve the user request by quantifying and comparing the appraisal of the 
resources. The simulation results show that our framework supports economic resources 
to achieve long-term high user satisfaction, differentiates malicious nodes from normal 
ones, and encourages the resources to provide high-quality services. 
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CHAPTER 7. FUTURE WORK 
There is much more that can be done to enhance the PeerCredential framework. 
Historical node strategy could possibly be improved by implementing price thresholds 
to prevent the bidding price from being too low. Simulations of nodes joining and leaving 
the P2P system should be done to investigate the effects it has on the system and the 
inclusion of more than two collaborative groups are needed to provide a more real world 
like scenario. 
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APPENDIX A. SIMULATION GRAPHS 
In this Appendix, we display all the charts that have been referred to in the thesis. 
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APPENDIX B. COLLABORATIVE GROUPS 
In this Appendix, we list all of the possible collaborative groups that may inhabit a 
P2P system. Here are a list of definitions that describe each of the actions a collaborative 
node may make: 
• Allow - Availability: Allow non-collaborative users to use the resource or reference. 
• Deny - Availability: Deny access to non-collaborative resources or references . 
• Lowest - $Price: Bid the minimum amount allowed by the system. 
• Normal - $Price: Bid using the historical node's algorithm. 
• Higher - $Price: Bid an amount that is above the result of using the historical 
node's algorithm. 
• Normal - Performance: Perform the job or provide information as a historical 
resource or reference would. 
• Malicious - Performance: Perform the job as a naive resource would. 
• Always False - Performance: Always provide false information regarding all refer-
ences. 
• Always Positive - Performance: Always provide positive information regarding all 
resources. 
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• Hype - Perforrnance: Provide negative information regarding non-collaborative 
resources and provide positive information regarding collaborative resources. 
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Table B.1 Listing of all Collaborative Groups, Part 1 
Res. Avail. Res. $ Res. Perf. Ref. Avail. Ref.$ Ref. Perf. 
Deny N/A N/A Deny N/A N/A 
Deny N/A N/A Allow Lowest Always False 
Deny N/A N/A Allow Normal Always False 
Deny N/A N/A Allow Higher Always False 
Deny N/A N/A Allow Lowest Normal 
Deny N/A N/A Allow Normal Normal 
Deny N/A N/A Allow Higher Normal 
Deny N/A N/A Allow Lowest Always Pos. 
Deny N/A N/A Allow Normal Always Pos. 
Deny N/A N/A Allow Higher Always Pos. 
Allow Lowest Malicious Allow Lowest Always False 
Allow Lowest Malicious Allow Normal Always False 
Allow Lowest Malicious Allow Higher Always False 
Allow Lowest Malicious Allow Lowest Normal 
Allow Lowest l'v1alicious Allow Normal Normal 
Allow Lowest Malicious Allow Higher Normal 
Allow Lowest Malicious Allow Lowest Always Pos. 
Allow Lowest Malicious Allow Normal Always Pos. 
Allow Lowest Malicious Allow Higher Always Pos. 
Allow Lowest Jvlalicious Allow Lowest Hype 
Allow Lowest Malicious Allow Normal Hype 
Allow Lowest Malicious Allow Higher Hype 
Allow Lowest Normal Allow Lowest Always False 
Allow Lowest Normal Allow Normal Always False 
Allow Lowest Norrnal Allow Higher Always False 
Allow Lowest Norrnal Allow Lowest Normal 
Allow Lowest Normal Allow Norrnal Normal 
Allow Lowest Normal Allow Higher Normal 
Allow Lowest Normal Allow Lowest Always Pos. 
Allow Lowest Norrnal Allow Normal Always Pos. 
Allow Lowest Normal Allow Higher Always Pos. 
Allow Lowest Normal Allow Lowest Hype 
Allow Lowest Normal Allow Normal Hype 
Allow Lowest Normal Allow Higher Hype 
Allow Norrnal Malicious Allow Lowest Always False 
Allow Normal Malicious Allow Normal Always False 
Allow Normal Malicious Allow Higher Always False 
Allow Norrnal Malicious Allow Lowest Normal 
Allow Normal Malicious Allow Normal Normal 
Allow Normal Malicious Allow Higher Normal 
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Table B.2 Listing of all Collaborative Groups, Part 2 
Res. Avail. Res. $ Res. Perf. Ref. Avail. Ref.$ Ref. Perf. 
Allow Normal Malicious Allow Lowest Always Pos. 
Allow Normal Malicious Allow Norrnal Always Pos. 
Allow Normal Malicious Allow Higher Always Pos. 
Allow Normal Malicious Allow Lowest Hype 
Allow Normal Malicious Allow Normal Hype 
Allow Nonnal Malicious Allow Higher Hype 
Allow Normal Nonnal Allow Lowest Always False 
Allow Norrnal Normal Allow Normal Always False 
Allow Normal Normal Allow Higher Always False 
Allow Normal Normal Allow Lowest Norrnal 
Allow Normal Normal Allow Normal Normal 
Allow Normal Norrnal Allow Higher Normal 
Allow Normal Normal Allow Lowest Always Pos. 
Allow Normal Normal Allow Normal Always Pos. 
Allow Normal Normal Allow Higher Always Pos. 
Allow Normal Normal Allow Lowest Hype 
Allow Normal Normal Allow Norrnal Hype 
Allow Normal Norrnal Allow Higher Hype 
Allow Higher Malicious Allow Lowest Always False 
Allow Higher Malicious Allow Normal Always False 
Allow Higher Malicious Allow Higher Always False 
Allow Higher Malicious Allow Lowest Normal 
Allow Higher Malicious Allow Normal Normal 
Allow Higher Malicious Allow Higher Normal 
Allow Higher Malicious Allow Lowest Always Pos. 
Allow Higher Malicious Allow Normal Always Pos. 
Allow Higher Malicious Allow Higher Always Pos. 
Allow Higher Malicious Allow Lowest Hype 
Allow Higher Malicious Allow Normal Hype 
Allow Higher Malicious Allow Higher Hype 
Allow Higher Nonnal Allow Lowest Always False 
Allow Higher Normal Allow Normal Always False 
Allow Higher Nonnal Allow Higher Always False 
Allow Higher Normal Allow Lowest Normal 
Allow Higher Normal Allow Normal Normal 
Allow Higher Normal Allow Higher Normal 
Allow Higher Norrnal Allow Lowest Always Pos. 
Allow Higher Normal Allow Normal Always Pos. 
Allow Higher Normal Allow Higher Always Pos. 
Allow Higher Norrnal Allow Lowest Hype 
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Table B.3 Listing of all Collaborative Groups. Part 3 
Res. Avail. Res. $ Res. Perf. Ref. Avail. Ref. $ Ref. Perf. 
Allow Higher Normal Allow Normal Hype 
Allow Higher Normal Allow Higher Hype 
Allow Lowest Nonnal Deny N/A N/A 
Allow Lowest Malicious Deny N/A N/A 
Allow Normal Normal Deny N/A N/A 
Allow Normal Malicious Deny N/A N/A 
Allow Higher Normal Deny N/A N/A 
Allow Higher Malicious Deny N/A N/A 
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